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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County which awarded monetary damages
and quieted title to a houseboat located at Hite Marina, Lake
Powell, Utah.

There have been no prior appeals.

Jurisdiction is based upon assignment from the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(j), Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
WITH CITATION TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to find that

Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by the doctrine
of res

judicata?
2.

(R 120-121; R 277 P 3-4)
Did the trial court err in finding that contrary

to the clear and unambiguous language of the written contract,
Plaintiff Paul Gardner rather than NUF, Inc. had a contractual
claim against Defendants Madsen? (R 277 P 3)
3.

Did the trial court err in failing to apply the

proper law to the undisputed facts that the corporate Plaintiff
had been dissolved prior to entry into the contract and that the
contract or any attempt to assign rights under that contract was
therefore void? (R 277, P 2)
4.

Did the trial err in assessing damages based upon

the full value of 3 0% of the total prime usage weeks when
Plaintiffs had purchased only 10% ownership in the entity, failed
to account for the value of non-peak weeks which had been
effectively converted to peak "summer" weeks, and in determining
that the subsequently formed Limited Liability Company was
responsible for any damages to Plaintiff?
(R 896-898)
5.

Did the trial court err in failing to disclose

that his nephew was a principal in the Plaintiff corporation and
a business partner of Plaintiff Paul Gardner, in failing to
recuse himself and in failing to grant a new trial before an
2

impartial judge? (R 905, P 21)
6.

Should Defendants be awarded their costs and

attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the action at trial
and on this appeal?

(R 277, P 16-17)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following standards of review apply to the issues for
review set forth herein:
a.

The standard of review for the trial court's

findings of fact is the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Alta Indus. LTD vs. Hurst. 846 P.2nd 1282, 186 (Utah 1993).
b.

The broadest scope of judicial review extends

to questions of law in order to insure that the law is applied
equally throughout the jurisdiction. State v. Pena, 869 P.2nd 936
(Utah 1994).
c.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion

in failing to disclose a close family relationship to a principal
in the case and by denying Defendants' Motion for a New Trial on
the basis of a judicial conflict of interest is reviewed by
whether the conduct was beyond the limits of reasonableness.
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993).
d.

The standard of review on the award of

attorney's fees at trial is abuse of discretion. Baldwin v.
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Sections 16-10-51, 16-10-88.2 and 16-10-100 of the Code
Annotated (Utah Business Corporation Act as effective 1990).
3

See Appendix A of Addendum.
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct: Terminology - (1) "Economic
interest"; (2) "Third degree of relationship"; and Canon 1; Canon
2 A and B; and Canon 3 E(l)(c)(d)(i-iv) and F.
See Appendix B of Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.
a.

Breach of Contract:

Where the purported

contract was entered into by a dissolved corporation and where a
principal of that dissolved corporation is attempting to enforce
the terms of that contract personally and on behalf of the
dissolved corporation.
b.

Judicial Conduct:

Where the trier of fact

failed to disclose a family relationship with a principal of and
business partner to Plaintiffs in the action.
c.

Res Judicata:

Where a previous court had

granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs for the same
complaint filed by the same principals with virtually the exact
wording of the case subsequently litigated.
d.

Damages:

Where the damages awarded to

Plaintiffs for breach of contract failed to account for the value
of what was undisputedly available to Plaintiffs.
2.

Course of Proceedings.
a.

First case:

Plaintiff NUF, Inc. filed suit

against Defendants Madsen claiming breach of contract.

Judge

Frederick granted Defendants' Summary Judgment that there was no
4

cause of action as a result of the corporation's dissolution by
the State.
b.

Second case:

Plaintiffs' filed the instant

case adding Paul Gardner as named Plaintiff and with NUF, Inc. as
a "D.B.A.".
for res

Judge Wilkinson denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

judicata

and their Motion for Summary Judgment, in which

they alleged that the contract had been entered into by a
corporation which had been dissolved, was therefore void, and
which gave Plaintiffs' no standing before the court.

Both

rulings were without comment nor findings.
c.

Post-trial:

Defendants filed a Motion for a

New Trial and Reassignment of Judge on the basis of the
subsequently discovered family relationship between the trial
judge and a party in interest in the case. That motion was
denied by Judge Wilkinson and subsequently denied by presiding
Judge Lewis.
3.

Disposition in the Trial Court. A two day bench

trial in which the court found that, contrary to the clear and
unambiguous language of the contract, the contract was entered
into by Plaintiff Paul Gardner and that all Defendants, including
the subsequently formed Limited Liability Company were liable to
Mr. Gardner for damages. The Court awarded compensatory damages
and attorney's fees to Plaintiffs of approximately $78,000.00 and
quieted title to 10% of the boat in Plaintiff Gardner personally.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

Plaintiff NUF, Inc. was incorporated in Utah on April 28,
5

1988, dissolved by the Corporations Division on May 1, 1990 and
never reinstated. (Hereinafter this corporation shall be "NUF
1".)

(R 161)
On June 15, 1990, less than 2 months after its dissolution,

Plaintiff NUF 1, through Paul Gardner as President, purportedly
entered into a contract with Defendants Kenneth and Marilyn
Madsen (hereinafter "Mr. Madsen" and "Mrs. Madsen") for the
purchase of a 10% interest in a houseboat known as "Nauti Lady"
(hereinafter "houseboat" in order to differentiate from the
Limited Liability Company of same name.) (P. Exh. 11)

None of

the parties to the contract was aware that NUF 1 had been
dissolved. (Tl at 3 8 and Tl at 60)

The undisputed consideration

for this purchase was $10,000.00. (Tl at 196)

Defendants claimed

that the consideration also included the payment of a
disproportionate share of the maintenance and upkeep expenses.
(Tl at 239-240)

Plaintiff characterized these payments as

justification for being entitled to 3 times the proportionate
amount of the prime (summer) usage weeks. (Tl at 42, 15-18)
Defendants denied an "entitlement" to the extra summer weeks but
did acknowledge that they had agreed to allow extra summer use on
a space available basis. (Tl at 198)
There had been discussions between Madsens and Paul Gardner
as President of NUF 1 before June 15, 1990, but only sparse
evidence as to whether these discussions took place on, before or
after May 1, 1990. (Tl at 125, 236 and 196, L4)
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs on nearly every
6

material issue of the case was diametrically opposed by
Defendants and their evidence.

The evidence on those issues were

as follows:
a.

Content of Contract:
(1)

Plaintiffs introduced Exhibit No. 11 as their

version of the contract.

The only person privy to the contract

on behalf of Plaintiffs was Paul Gardner who testified that there
had been no alteration to the face or body of the contract since
it had been executed. (Tl at 41, 2-5)
(2)

Mr. Madsen testified that at the time that

the contract was executed, he initialled minor changes to the
contract, but those changes did not include the word "summer".
(Tl at 195, 1-16)

Mr. Madsen's copy of the contract, Defendants'

Exhibit #2 did not contain the interlineation with the word
"summer", but did contain the same initials for Mr. Madsen that
appeared on Plaintiff's copy. (T2 at 41, 1-17)

Mr. Madsen

emphatically denied that the word "summer" was ever written into
the contract in his presence or with his approval. (T2 at 44, 1425)

Finally, Mr. Madsen testified that in his business

experience it was always his practice to initial all copies of
the contract when changes had been made. (T2 at 45, 2-13)
(3)

Defendant's expert witness, George

Throckmorton, testified that Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 had been
altered after changes made to the contract had been photocopied.
(T2 at 38, 8-11)

The original changes were written by the same

pen and hand that had written the initials KM [Defendant Kenneth

7

Madsen] (T2 at 38, 13-23)

He further stated that there was ..."a

third pen that was used that wrote in the word "summer" and the
slashing line that pointed between the words "weeks" and "each".
(T2:38:24)

He also noted that the third pen had not been used

elsewhere in the document. (T2 at 39, 2-5)
(4)

In his ruling, Judge Wilkinson found that 6

summer weeks, equivalent to 3 0% of the peak usage time was a
reasonable interpretation of the contract in consideration for
Plaintiffs' purchase of a 10% ownership. (R 277 at 5, 25) 1
b.

Parties to Contract:
(1)

On their case in chief Plaintiffs provided no

evidence that the contract was entered into by any person or
entity other than NUF 1.

On cross-examination Mr. Gardner

admitted that he had filled in the blank with the buyers
information and that no one else had told him to write in "NUF,
Inc." (Tl at 112-113)

When specifically asked about his

intention at the time that he executed the contract, he stated
that it was his intention to enter into the contract on behalf of
"NUF, Inc.". (Tl at 113, 10-13)

However, in his redirect

testimony Paul Gardner raised for the first time the claim that
he had personally purchased 10% of the houseboat. (Tl at 12 9, 1213)

Gardner did admit that he had stricken the original words

x

After 2 requests the appellate clerks at the Third District
could not locate the original transcript of the judge's bench
ruling. A copy of the first page of that ruling is included at
page 277 of the record. As a convenience to the Court, Appellants
have attached a copy of the entire ruling as appendix C to their
brief. Page numbers correlate to those in that attachment.
8

"husband and wife" when he inserted the words "NUF, Inc" as
buyer. (Tl at 112, 12-32)
(2)

Mr. Madsen testified that the contract was

drafted with NUF, Inc. (NUF 1) as the Buyer. (Tl at 236, 16)

Mr.

Madsen further testified that Mr. Gardner had told him that the
ownership of the houseboat was to be placed in the name of the
corporation to protect it from Mr. Gardner's wife, with whom he
was experiencing some marital difficulties. (Tl at 236, 18-20)
He emphatically denied that the contract had been made with Paul
Gardner personally. (Tl at 236, 21-23)
(3)

The wording of the contract itself is very

clear and unambiguous.

The parties to the contract are clearly

Mr. and Mrs. Madsen and "NUF, Inc. a Utah Corporation".
(P. Exh. 1, Page 1)

In addition, it is clear from even the

photocopy of the contract presented by Plaintiffs that Paul
Gardner signed on behalf of the buyer as "NUF, Inc. by Paul
Gardner, its president". (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, Page 4)
(4)

Judge Wilkinson ruled that the contract was

actually between Mr. Gardner personally and Madsens.
c.

Limited Liability Company:
(1)

Plaintiffs provided no evidence regarding any

contractual rights between them and Defendant Nauti Lady L.L.C.
(2)

Defendants' evidence showed that, subsequent

to the contract between them and NUF 1, they had sold shares to 2
other parties, subsequent to which a Limited Liability Company
was formed for the purpose of managing the houseboat. (T2 at 6-7)
9

(3)

The letter submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit

No. 45 which Plaintiff Gardner claimed to be an infringement of
his rights by the L.L.C. clearly states that it is written on
behalf of Madsens as the party with whom Plaintiffs had their
contract. (P. Exh. 45)

The correspondence also reflects that

Plaintiffs use of the boat was not suspended until after
Plaintiffs filed the litigation. (Exh. 23, Tl at 81-82) 2

In his

cross-examination, Mr. Gardner admitted that no one had taken any
action to suspend his ongoing usage of the boat until after he
filed suit against Madsens. (Tl at 40)
(4)

In its ruling, the court found that the

Limited Liability Company was jointly and severally liable for
the damages to Plaintiffs for the loss of use after formation of
the company. (R 8 96-898)
d.

Damages:
(1)

Mr. Gardner testified that he had only used

the boat 9 times since entry into the contract. (Tl at 63, 18-19)
Even with this testimony the court found that he had used the
boat 6 times. (R 277 at P 15)

Although he made vague claims to

having been denied use of weeks, (Tl at 64-65) he provided no
evidence as to the weeks that had been requested and denied,
other than the week for which his use had been forfeited as a
result of the violation of the houseboat rules. (Tl at 63, 22-24)

2

Mr. Gardner then states that he contacted Mr. Summerhays
after receiving the letter. However, the letter was dated July 27,
1993. Mr. Summerhays filed the first complaint against Madsens on
July 8, 1993. (See Civil # 930903925)
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(2)

Mr. Madsen testified on the basis of rental

inquiries which he had made, flyers published by the Lake Powell
concessionaire and his own knowledge of the comparison of
houseboats available for rent on the lake that the average rental
value during the peak summer months was $1,800.00.

When he

attempted to testify as to the value of off-peak weeks, that
testimony was excluded by the trial judge. (Tl and 231)

However,

Defendants' Exhibit 3, which was admitted shows the going rates
for off-season rentals for a 50 foot boat to be $1,199. (D. Exh.
3)

He also testified that the agreement had been for Plaintiffs

to utilize the boat on a space available basis, and that the
requests made by Plaintiff had been met except when the boat was
down for repairs and the week that was forfeited as a result of
Gardner's repeated rule violations. (Tl at 198 and Tl at 201)
(3)

In making its ruling, the court ignored the

reality that it had, in fact, converted Plaintiff's off season
weeks into prime weeks.

In doing so, the court assessed the

damages on the basis of $1,800.00 per week, totally ignoring the
value of the off season weeks to which Plaintiff had been
otherwise entitled under the contract. (Ruling P 15 Ll-3)

The

court also based those damages on the assumption that Gardner had
been denied each week that he did not use the boat. (Ruling P 15
at 15-18)

It made no finding as to the number of weeks that had

been requested and denied, nor the availability of the boat
during the off-season.

11

e.

Maintenance Assessment:
(1)

Mr. Gardner testified for Plaintiffs that he

had agreed to pay 2 0% of the maintenance expenses because "I'd be
using the boat more than him [Mr. Madsen]" (Tl at 42, 14-18)
(2)

Mr. Madsen testified that the document had

been originally drafted with a 25% allocation of maintenance
expenses to each buyer, but that it had been changed to 2 0% at
the request of Mr. Gardner since there would be ultimately 5
users of the boat in the long run, and 2 0% would reflect an equal
allocation between the 5. (Tl at 239)

Mr. Madsen testified that

the 25% was based upon the fact that the minority shareholders
would split the maintenance costs since they had contributed less
toward the purchase price (Tl at 240)
f.

Operator Damage:
(1)

Mr. Gardner testified that he "voluntarily

agreed to pay" for the repair of the outdrives on the boat. (Tl
at 45, 11-13)

This was supposedly done as a gesture of "good

faith" so that the boat would be functional for the following
summer. (Tl at 45, 13-15)

At trial Mr. Gardner claimed that

these payments were "advances" on his 2 0% obligation for any
maintenance fee obligations. (Tl at 38, 14-25)

He claimed that

major damage to the boat was to be paid from the maintenance fee
into which all owners would contribute in proportion to their
ownership. (Tl at 45, 16-2 0 and Tl at 146, 5-8)
(2)

Mr. Madsen testified that the maintenance fee

was to cover routine maintenance and not damage caused to the

12

boat by operator negligence. (Tl at 209, 23-25 and Tl at 210, 825)

He stated that Mr. Gardner had caused the damage to the

outdrives, and that at the time Gardner agreed to make the
payment for those repairs since he had been at fault and felt
obligated to do so under the contract. (T2 at 50, 4-19, T2 at 52,
4-25 and T2 at 55, 1-10)
(3)

The relevant paragraph of the contract is No.

4, which as modified by the parties reads:
BUYERS further agree to reimburse SELLERS for
twenty-five (25%) (20%) [parties' initials]
percent of any out of pocket expenses
reasonably incurred to keep the property and
equipment thereon in good working order or to
repair any damages or equipment failures NOT
INCURRED BY ANY ONE PARTY. (Refer to Boat
Rules and Regulation).
The last six words of the sentence are clear, appear in all
capital letters in the contract, and are followed by a reference
to the Rules and Regulations for the boat.
g.

Propeller repair:
(1)

Mr. Gardner admitted that he repaired the

propeller on at least one occasion but claims that he did not
damage it. (Tl at 55-57)
(2)

Mr. Madsen testified that several damaged

props were discovered upon arrival at the lake during the weeks
after Mr. Gardner had used the boat. (Tl at 210-212)

Neither Mr.

Madsen nor Mrs. Madsen could testify that they saw Mr. Gardner
cause the damage, but both did testify that when the boat was
last in their control it was in good repair but that after
Gardner's use it had been damaged.
13

(Tl at 201 and T2 at 23)

(3) The court made no ruling as to the damaged
propellers but lumped these items into the normal maintenance
category. (Ruling at 11-12)
In addition to five pages of the basic contract, the
document included 4 attachments (the Rules and Regulations,
checklists to be executed upon the commencement and termination
of each usage, an inventory of the items included on the
houseboat and miscellaneous cleaning instructions)• (T2 at 17,
15-23)

Mr. Gardner testified that he faithfully utilized the

checklists when he arrived at the houseboat and when he left it.
(Tl at 84, 7-21 and T2 at 88, 7-12)

However, on cross-

examination Mr. Gardner did not know the difference between the
oil breather vent and the access for the oil dipstick on the main
engines. (T2 at 81-82)

In fact, he testified that it was

impossible to check the oil in the engines because there was no
dipstick in the breather vent. (T2 at 74)
Similarly, the court found Plaintiffs to be responsible for
the damage to the refrigerator, the proper procedures for which
were included in the checklist. (R at 12, 15-17)
In 1991 Madsens sold a second 10% share of the houseboat to
a third party with a contract virtually identical for that used
with Plaintiff NUF 1.

The changes to that contract were

consistent with those admittedly made by Kenneth Madsen in the
contract with NUF 1. (Tl at 198, 19-25)

The changes to this

contract were confirmed by the buyer, Duane Shaw, both as to
timing and extent and all changes were initialled by the parties.
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(T2 at 12, 4-19)
In early June 1993 Defendants Madsen discovered conclusive
evidence that Gardner had violated the rule regarding pets on the
houseboat, in that Gardner had kept a dog on the boat during the
first week in June 1993. (T2 at 58, 17-18)

Gardner ultimately

admitted having the dog on the boat, but denied knowing that it
was an infraction of the rules. The Court did find that he had
received those rules. (Ruling

at 7, 5-22)

The unrebutted

testimony was that the infraction was considered serious because
several of the users had experienced allergy problems from pet
dander.
After discovering the evidence of the pet violation,
Defendants Madsen notified Gardner that his disregard for the
rules was intolerable and that he would forfeit his next week
usage as a result of the most recent violation. (T2 at 58, 1-25
and P. Exh. 45)

This is the only week that all parties agreed

had been requested by Gardner and subsequently denied.
The NUF/Madsen contract did not specify any procedures for
due process regarding violations.

The contract did, however,

provide for forfeiture due for rule violations. (Exh D-2, Rules
8, 10 and 13)

There was no evidence at trial that anyone other

than Plaintiffs (i.e. 10% of the ownership) objected to the
sanctions imposed for the repeated violations by Gardner.
Gardner filed the first action against Defendants Madsen on
or about July 8, 1993. That action was assigned Civil No.
93 0903 925 and assigned to J. Dennis Frederick of the Third
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District Court, Salt Lake County. (R at 120)
On August 26, 1993, Judge Frederick, granted summary
judgment against Plaintiff NUF, Inc. on the grounds that NUF,
Inc. had been dissolved by statute and was not a legal entity
entitled to pursue the action.

No appeal of this decision was

ever filed by NUF 1. (R at 121, 141 and 146)
On August 12, 1993, Gardner caused to be filed with the
Corporations Division a new entity known as NUF, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "NUF 2"). (R 122 at para. 11)

On or

about October 19, 1993, through the same attorney Gardner and NUF
2 filed the present suit against Defendants Madsen but also named
the Limited Liability Company as a Defendant. (R 121 at para. 15)
There was no evidence that Gardner was not the real party in
interest in both suits nor that the Limited Liability Company had
done anything contrary to Plaintiffs' interests after the
judgment was entered in the first case.

This action was

improperly filed in the Circuit Court but was ultimately
transferred and assigned Civil No. 93 0906772, before Judge Homer
J. Wilkinson, (hereinafter Instant Case.) (R 121 at para. 16)
With the exception of the heading, which included Paul
Gardner personally as a Plaintiff, Nauti Lady, L.L.C. as a newly
named Defendant and a new Count No. VI which related to a
purported cause of action against the L.L.C. that transpired
before August 26, 1993, the Complaint in case 2 was exactly the
same as that which had been dismissed by Judge Frederick in Case
No. 1.

The purported cause of action arose from the same
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contract, with all of the same signatures and changes.

Even the

grammatical and spelling errors were identical. (R at 121, para.
5 and R at 122-123)
On or about July 27, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss the second case on the grounds of res judicata.

(R 13-14)

Plaintiffs responded that NUF, Inc. was [now] a corporation in
good standing and capable of filing and pursuing the action.3 (R
31 at para. 1)

Defendants' motion was denied without findings or

comment by Judge Wilkinson on May 3, 1994. (R 66)
Defendants subsequently made a Motion for Summary Judgment
on the same grounds set forth in the first case before Judge
Fredericks, i.e. that NUF 1 was the only entity that had been a
party to the Madsen contract, and that any rights which NUF 1
might have had were terminated by the corporate dissolution.
(R120)

Defendants specifically alleged that NUF 2 was a totally

separate legal entity, had no interest in the June 15, 1990
contract, and had no cause of action against these Defendants. (R
12 0-121)

The court declined to rule on the motion even after the

presentation of the Plaintiff's case at trial. (Tl at 190, 6-25
and R at 277, P3 L25 - P4 L2)
At trial Defendants learned that Clayton H. Wilkinson was an
3

The significance of NUF 2 was made clear by Plaintiffs in
their response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss which was filed in
the Circuit Court prior to the transfer of the case to District
Court. Paragraph 1 from their statement of facts reads as follows:
"The Plaintiff NUF, Inc. is a Utah Corporation filed and
incorporated on August 12, 1993, for the purpose of
continuing the business operation of NUF, Inc. a prior
Utah corporation." (R. 31 at para. 1)
17

incorporator and director of Plaintiff NUF, Inc., a close
personal friend and a business partner of Plaintiff Paul Gardner.
(Tl at 124, 2-4), (Tl at 181-188) and (T2 at 79, L22 as Exh 53)
Unknown to Defendants Mr. Wilkinson is a nephew of the judge who
presided over the bench trial in this matter. (R 346 para. 4)
Although his name and his close personal ties to the case were
mentioned on at least 3 separate occasions during trial, Judge
Wilkinson made no comment nor disclosure regarding his family
relationship to Clayton Wilkinson.

Defendants learned of the

relationship well after the completion of the trial when
Defendant Kenneth Madsen received an anonymous telephone call on
the subject. (R 345-346)

He then hired a genealogist to check

whether the anonymous caller had been correct. (R 348-35 0)

Upon

receipt of the confirmation he filed a Motion for New Trial and
Reassignment of Judge. (R 343)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
Prior to the filing of their complaint in this matter, Judge
Frederick had granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs on a
complaint that was virtually identical to the complaint filed in
this action.

The complaint was filed by the same attorney, had

all of the same parties in interest and arose from the same
contract between Plaintiffs and Defendants Madsen.

Although

Plaintiffs added Paul Gardner personally as a Plaintiff, there is
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no question but that Mr. Gardner was privy to, and was in fact
the real party in interest on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first
case.

Similarly, although Plaintiffs named Nauti Lady, L.L.C. as

a party defendant in the second case, the L.L.C. was formed
subsequent to the contract in question and any actions by the
L.L.C. preceded the summary judgment against Plaintiffs in the
first case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT,
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN
Contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the
contract between the parties, the trial judge went beyond the
four corners of that document to reach a determination that
Plaintiff Paul Gardner personally was a party to the contract
with standing to bring this action against Defendants.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID
Contrary to the finding by the trial court the dissolved
corporation could not make an assignment of its rights to
Plaintiff Paul Gardner.

The Plaintiff corporation was dissolved

prior to entry into the contract at issue and never reinstated.
The contract was in no way related to the statutory entitlement
to "wind up the affairs of the corporation", lacked an essential
element (i.e. 2nd party) and was therefore void.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL ERRED IN ASSESSING INAPPROPRIATE DAMAGES
BASED UPON THE FULL VALUE OF 3 0% OF THE TOTAL PRIME
USAGE WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP
IN THE ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NONPEAK WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF
The measure of damages applied by the trial court was
improper since Plaintiffs failed to prove that they had been
denied usage of the boat.

Testimony presented that they had "not

used the boat" fell short of the requirement to prove denial of
usage.

Furthermore, the court awarded damages based upon the

total value of the prime summer weeks rather than on the
difference between the value of those weeks and the weeks which
were admittedly made available to Plaintiffs.

Finally, the trial

court erred in assessing attorney's fees against Defendants under
a provision of the void contract.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE
The issues of the case were extremely fact sensitive, and
hinged upon the credibility of the only two participants in the
execution of the contract, Plaintiff Paul Gardner and Defendant
Kenneth Madsen.

Unbeknownst to Defendants, an incorporator and

director of the corporate Plaintiff is the nephew of the trial
judge.

At trial on three separate occasions the name of this

nephew, his affiliation to the corporate Plaintiff and the fact
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that he was a "business partner and close friend" of Plaintiff
Paul Gardner were disclosed.

As soon as Defendants became aware

of the family relationship they filed a Motion for New Trial and
Reassignment of Judge, which motion was denied.
POINT VI
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF THEIR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION
AT TRIAL AND ON THIS APPEAL
Plaintiffs' filing of the second case in the face of the
summary judgment previously granted by Judge Frederick rises to
the requisite standard of § 78-27-56 which entitles Defendants to
an award of their costs and attorney's fees incurred both at
trial and on this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
As set forth in the facts above, Plaintiff NUF, Inc. (NUF 1)
brought an action arising out of the June 15, 1990 contract
before Judge J. Dennis Frederick as Civil No. 93 0903 925.

Judge

Frederick granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the
basis that NUF 1 was the party to the contract, but that since
the corporation had been dissolved there was no legal entity
capable of bringing an action on its behalf. (R 141)

That case

involved the same parties in interest, although Paul Gardner was
not named personally, and the subsequently filed Limited
Liability Company was not name specifically as a party defendant.
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From the time that the first complaint was resolved by
summary judgment and until the time that the second complaint was
filed there arose no additional causes of action.

In fact, there

were no additional transactions of any kind between the
respective parties in interest and their privies.
Plaintiffs have merely attempted to circumvent the doctrine
of res

judicata

by naming as a party plaintiff the person who was

the real party in interest in the first case and by adding a new
party defendant.
Recently, the Supreme Court analyzed the concepts of
collateral estoppel

and res judicata

in the matter of Jones,

Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough v. Jerilyn Shelton Dawson, 298 Utah
Adv. Rep 8 (1996) citing Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629
(Utah 1995) Justice Howe stated that
"...issue preclusion prevents the parties
from relitigating issues resolved in a prior
related action. The parties seeking
collateral estoppel must first satisfy four
requirements. First, the issue challenged
must be identical in the previous action and
the case at hand. The issue must have been
decided in a final judgment on the merits in
the previous action. Third, the issue must
have been completely, fully, and fairly
litigated in the previous action. Fourth,
the party against whom collateral estoppel is
invoked in the current action must have been
either a party or privy to a party in the
previous action." Id. at 4 citing Sevy
(other citations omitted)
In the case at hand, Plaintiff NUF, Inc. brought the
identical contract claim against Defendants Madsen, the parties
with whom they entered into their contract.

As cited above, with

the exception of the addition of Paul Gardner as a named
22

Plaintiff and the Limited Liability Company as a named Defendant,
the first five counts of Plaintiff's second complaint were
verbatim the same as the first complaint.

The sixth count,

although adding a purported cause of action against the Limited
Liability Company, did not raise any issues that did not exist at
the time that Judge Frederick entered his judgment.
On the second criteria, Judge Frederick's summary judgment
was, in fact, a final judgment on the merits based upon existing
law.
The third criteria is also satisfied in that the issues were
fully presented to Judge Frederick fully and completely in an
exhaustive brief by Plaintiffs. At no time have Plaintiffs
claimed that the issue was not competently presented to Judge
Frederick.
With respect to the fourth criteria, Paul Gardner's
testimony throughout the trial clearly indicated that NUF, Inc.
was a closely held corporation, which he treated almost as an
"alter ego". Although he was not physically named in the first
case, as president of NUF, Inc. he was clearly privy to that
party in the previous action.
In the earlier case of Jacobsen v. Jacobsenf 703 P.2d 303
(Utah 1985) Justice Durham citing Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610
P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980) defined the doctrine of res
as follows:
"When there has been a adjudication, it
becomes res judicata as to those issues which
were either tried and determined or upon all
issues which the party had a fair opportunity
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judicata

to present and have determined in the other
proceeding. Jacobsen at 3 05.
Gardner and NUF, Inc. were capable of presenting all of the
issues claimed in the second case when the matter was presented
to Judge Frederick for summary judgment in the first case.
Particularly, in light of Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and
Motions for Summary Judgment in the second case on the basis of
res

judicata

and the dissolution of the corporation, the burden

was placed upon Plaintiffs to show that for some reason they were
unable to present any additional claims that were made in the
second case.

Plaintiffs failed to do so, and their failure

estops them from denying that the second action was barred by the
doctrine.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT,
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN
"To preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent
of the parties to a written integrated contract should be found
within the four corners of that instrument.!l Stanger v. Sentinel
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1983) citing

Utah Valley

Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981) (emphasis in original.)
"The doctrine of partial integration is that where a
written contract is obviously not, or is shown not to
be, the complete contract, parol evidence not
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show
what the entire contract really was, by supplementing
as distinguished from contradicting, the writing". Id.
at 1205.
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In the present case there is no finding by the court, nor
was there any evidence admitted at the trial, that the contract
in question was incomplete.

Within the "four corners" of the

contract, the Buyer was "NUF, Inc. a Utah Corporation" and the
Sellers were defined as Kenneth Madsen and Marilyn Madsen.

The

clarity of this position, and the intent of the parties is
further substantiated by the manner in which the contract was
signed on behalf of Buyer, i.e. "NUF, Inc. by [Gardner's
signature]".

The signature form was handwritten by Plaintiff

Paul Gardner on the June 15, 1990 contract and on the undated
supplemental change shown on the last page of the contract (when
NUF 1 purported to purchase an additional interest in wave
runners). (Pi Exh. 11; Def Exh. 2)
In Stanger, the Supreme Court allowed parol evidence, but it
was on an issue that was not specifically covered by the written
contract.

In the case at hand, the parties are clearly defined

and no parol evidence is necessary to make that determination.
More recently this Court has ruled in Sprouse v. Jager, 8 06 P.2d
219 (Utah App. 1991) that:
"The settled rule for interpreting a contract
is to first 'look to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intention of the
parties. The use of extrinsic evidence is
permitted only if the document appears to
incompletely express the parties' agreement
or if it is ambiguous in expressing that
agreement'." citing Ron Case Roofing and
Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382,
1385 (Utah 1989) (other citations omitted)
The law is clear that there are essential requirements to
any contract.

These elements are (1) proper subject matter; (2)
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an offer and acceptance; (3) competent parties; and (4)
appropriate consideration.

Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals,

Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1988)

See also

Sugarhouse Finance

Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).
Although paragraph 4 of the contract at issue here is not as
artfully drafted by Defendants as would be the case had the
contract been prepared by legal counsel, the Utah Supreme Court
has made it clear on numerous occasions that the contract should
be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning
of the words used." Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 1321 P.2d
223, 7 Utah 2nd 166 (Utah 1958)

The Ephraim court held that:

"The understanding thus expressed is plain
and provides no justification for a finding
based upon conduct, that the defendants had a
firm obligation to pay the rent regardless of
income from the business. Unless uncertainty
opens the door to extraneous explanation, the
trial court is in no position of advantage in
interpreting documents, and his views thereon
are not indulged any special credit as are
findings on issues of fact." id. at 167, fn
2.
For the trial court to find, contrary to the specific and
unambiguous terms of the contract itself that the agreement was
between Paul Gardner personally and Madsens is clearly an abuse
of discretion.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID
Plaintiff NUF Inc. (NUF 1) was dissolved on May 1, 1990. No
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action was ever taken to reinstate the corporation.

§ 16-10-

88.2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, as in effect on June 15,
1990, provides that:
The dissolution of any corporation precludes
that corporation from doing business in its
corporate character under any name or assumed
names filed on behalf of the dissolved
corporation under Section 42-2-5. (Emphasis
added)
Subsection 5 of that section did, at that time, provide for
a reinstatement within one (1) year after the dissolution,
subject to certain conditions:
(5) Any corporation which has been dissolved
under this section may, within one year from
the date of dissolution, be reinstated upon
application and payment of all past due
taxes, penalties, and reinstatement fees.
There is no evidence in the record that NUF, Inc. made any
effort at reinstatement.

In fact, the principals filed a new

corporation, by the same name, for the purported purpose of
"continuing the business operation of NUF, Inc., a prior Utah
corporation". (R 31)
Finally, § 16-10-100 of the Utah Business Corporation Act
then in effect provided that a corporation may pursue any
remedies available to it so long as the action is commenced
within two years of the dissolution.
"The dissolution of a corporation either (1)
by the issuance of a Certificate of
Dissolution by the Division of Corporations
and Commercial Code, ... shall not take away
any remedy available to or against the
corporation, its directors, officers or
shareholders, for any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to
such dissolution if action or other
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proceeding thereon is commenced within two
years after the date of such dissolution."
The Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this provision in tne
case of Murphy v. Croslandf 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994).

This

Court said that a corporation does not have authority to conduct
business when its right to conduct business has been suspended.
Id at 80.
In a case analogous to the one at hand, the Utah Supreme
Court, in analyzing a contract dispute involving a municipal
corporation stated that:
Any contract, express or implied, between
plaintiffs and the county is subject to the
statutory and constitutional limitations on
the county as a governing body. The county
only has those rights and powers granted it
by the Utah Constitution and statutes or
those implied as a necessary means to
accomplish them. Any act by the county in
excess of this authority or forbidden by the
Utah Constitution is null and void as an
ultra vires act. Weese v. Davis County
Commission, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992).
It is also clear that when a purported contract is missing
an essential material element, then the contract is void.

By

analogy, if one party is precluded by law from entering into a
marriage, but purports to do so, then the marriage contract is
considered to be void ab initio.

Anderson v. Anderson, 240 P.2d

966, 121 Utah 237 (Utah 1952).
In their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judge Plaintiffs' claimed standing under the common law
as a de facto

corporation.

However, under the common law, a

corporation was considered to be extinct for all purposes once it
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had been dissolved. 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 2838.
In 1994 this Court verified this position in the case of
Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994) when it said:
No corporation de facto could exist under the
common law where the corporation's charter
had been revoked by judicial decree or
statutory forfeiture [amounting to
involuntary dissolution]. Fletcher Sec. 3844,
cited in Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d at 78
(Utah App. 1994).
This case dealt with the Utah Business Corporation Act which
was in effect in 1990, prior to the 1992 amendments.

Crosland

Industries, Inc. was suspended for failure to file an annual
report in 1987 and was dissolved in 1988 for failure to restore
its good standing.
The Murphy court continued:
"According to a number of cases, a
corporation which has been dissolved...is not
even a de facto corporation for the reason
that there can be no corporation de facto
when there cannot be a corporation de jure,
and that there can be no color of corporate
existence after the corporate death." Ld at
78.
More recently, in the case of Holman v. Callisterf Duncan &
Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1995), in the context of a
malpractice action brought by principals of a dissolved
corporation against their attorneys, this Court reaffirmed that:
"Under a common law the corporation ceased to exist at
dissolution," citing Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah
342, 350-51, 213 P. 187, 190 (1922).

For that reason, a

dissolved corporation was
"incapable of maintaining an action; and all
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such actions pending at the time of
dissolution abate, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary." citing Holman v.
Callister, Duncan & Nebekerf 905 P.2d at 897898, also citing Chicago Title and Trust Co.
v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 402 U.S. 120,
125, 58 S.Ct. 125, 127, 82 L.Ed. 147 (1937).
Similarly, under the common law:
"If a state has already acted to terminate
the corporation's existence, a private party
may raise the lack of corporate existence as
a defense to an action involving purely
private rights." 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations,
Section 2825 (citing Hearth Corp. v. C.B.R.
Dev. Co.. 210 NW2d 632 (Iowa).
In this case, Defendants clearly raised the lack of
corporate existence as a defense to the action. (R 13 and 12 0)
In fact, it was this defense which resulted in Judge Frederick
granting summary judgment against Plaintiffs in the original
case.

It was the subject of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in

this action, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiffs' claim against Defendants clearly involved a private
contract right, as opposed to a public policy right. Id. at 635.
Pursuant to the statutes set forth in the Utah Business
Corporations Act as it existed in 1990, § 16-10-88.2 clearly sets
forth that the corporations' authority to conduct business as
usual has been suspended.
"The dissolution of a corporation becomes
operative for all purposes at the termination
of the period allowed by statute for the
settlement and winding up of its affairs; as
a general rule, it becomes entirely extinct
as a corporation, and its powers cease." 19
Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 2840 (citing
Clark v. American Cannel Coal Co., 165 Ind
213, 73 NE 1083; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn 724, 69 SW 345).
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This provision was interpreted in Murphy v. Crosland, where
this Court said that
"...corporate suspension under UBCA section
16-10-88.2 resulted in suspension of a
corporation's authority to conduct business
as usual. A corporation suspended under this
statute could engage only in activities
necessary to wind up its affairs or to remedy
its suspension. UBCA Section 16-10-139
applies to a suspended corporation; anyone
acting on the corporations' behalf who
exceeds the corporations remaining authority
is jointly and severally liable for debts and
liabilities incurred as a result." Id. at
84.
The Murphy court refers to a footnote in the Utah Supreme
Court case of MacKay and Knobel Enters, v. Teton Van Gas, Inc.,
460 P.2d at 829 (1969) in which the Court defined the concept of
winding up its affairs to include protection of assets, paying
creditors and "otherwise winding up its business." Id. fn. 17.
In making its finding that Plaintiff Paul Gardner should
have the benefit of the NUF contract, the trial court appears to
have extrapolated the statutory extension of liability referred
to in § 16-10-139 above. (R. 277 at P3 L16 through P4 L5)

This

ruling is clearly inconsistent with this Court's ruling in
Holman.

In that case as this, the plaintiff either held or

controlled all of the shares of stock of the defunct corporation.
Holman was the sole director or officer of the defunct
corporation, and Holman personally relied on the advice given by
the attorney against whom the malpractice claim was made.

Holman

at 899.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Holman also claimed that
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he had been personally damaged as a result of the negligent
services performed on behalf of the defunct corporation, as a
result of an implied attorney-client relationship, but that this
Court was not willing to extend any corporate remedies to him as
a result of that claim.
Although § 16-10-100 of the Utah Code Annotated (repealed
July 1, 1992) did provide a 2 year period during which the
principals of a corporation could pursue a claim on behalf of the
corporation, even the first action filed by Plaintiffs in this
matter was filed more than two years after the date of the
dissolution.

In Holman, this Court refused to allow Plaintiff to

proceed on the basis of this statute."

Id. at 8 97.

The same

rule should apply in this case.
Since NUF, Inc. was dissolved prior to the date of the
contract, then Paul Gardner had no legal capacity to enter into
the contract with Defendants.

Since that left the contract

without the requisite parties, the contract was void.

And,

although the statute provides that Paul Gardner may be personally
liable for the tort and contract damages incurred by Defendants
as a result of his acting without authority, neither the statutes
nor the case law provide a basis for Mr. Gardner to benefit from
his violation of the statutes.
Although the trial court was concerned that there had been
an assignment of the corporation's rights to Mr. Gardner, such an
assignment would be clearly impossible under the facts of the
case. (R 277 at P3, 1-15)

Specifically, although Plaintiffs
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provided no specific dates, no minutes, no resolutions nor any
other documentation regarding an assignment, it is clear that the
meeting at which they claimed the assignment took place occurred
prior to June 15, 1990, the date on which the contract was
executed. (Tl at 125)

Since Plaintiffs claim that the meeting

took place before May 1, 1990, then no contract had been entered
into and therefore no rights existed which were capable of
assignment.

Similarly, there is no evidence of any consideration

transferred from Mr. Gardner to the corporation, that being an
essential element of such an assignment.

Finally, any

provisional or assignment of future rights would have ceased to
exist on May 1, 1990, when the corporation was dissolved.
Clearly, entry into a new contract for use of a houseboat
did not fit within the purview of the statutory two year
extension.

Similarly, it is clear that the period of two years

had long since expired prior to Mr. Gardner filing either of the
actions against Madsens on behalf of the dissolved corporation.
After dissolution, NUF, Inc. had no powers to enter into a
contract, nor did it have any power granted from the state of
Utah to pursue any litigation against Defendants. As in Weese,
the purported contract was null and void.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES BASED UPON
THE FULL VALUE OF 30% OF THE TOTAL PRIME USAGE WHEN
PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP IN THE
ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NON-PEAK
WEEKS WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF
The Restatement of Contracts 2d recognizes that judicial
remedies for breach of contract serve to protect one or more of
the following interests of a promisee:
11

(a) his 'expectation interest', which is the interest
in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed;
(b) his 'reliance interest', which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made; or
(c) his 'restitution interest', which is his interest
in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred
on the other party." (cited in 22 Am Jur 2d, Damage, § 43)
By way of explanation to subparagraph a, Am Jur provides the
following:
"Contract damages are ordinarily based on the
injured party's expectation interest and are
intended to give him the benefit of the
bargain by awarding a sum of money that will,
to the extent possible, put him in as good a
position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed. Moreover, his
recovery is limited to the loss he has
actually suffered by reason of the breach; he
is not entitled to be placed in a better
position than he would have been in if the
contract had not been broken". 22 Am Jur 2d
Damages, Section 45.
At trial Plaintiff Gardner made some broad sweeping
allegations regarding unavailability of requested dates, but
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provided only one instance where he had been actually been denied
the use of the houseboat. (Tl at 64-65)

That denial was for Week

#27 of 1993 which was declared by Madsens to be "forfeited" as a
result of Gardner's repeated violation of the houseboat rules,
the most recent of which had arisen from the conclusive proof
obtained by Madsens that Gardner had kept his dog on the
houseboat during the first week of usage in June of 1993 . There
is a major gap between Mr. Gardner simply not scheduling the boat
for use and his being deprived of usage by Defendants.
In reality, simple arithmetic leads to the conclusion that
10% of the houseboat usage during a calendar year would entitle
an owner to 5.2 weeks usage, with that usage spread
proportionately throughout the year.

Under such a proportional

distribution, 2 of those weeks would be treated as "summer" weeks
under the court's definition.

R 277, P 14, L 22)

With a

reasonable expectation of down-time for repairs on the boat of 2
weeks, each 10% owner would then be entitled to 5 weeks usage
throughout the year, which is exactly what the unmodified
contract provided.

That is consistent with both parties

testimony regarding the expectation of additional partners, and
particularly Mr. Madsen's testimony that they anticipated a total
of 4 additional owners besides themselves in order to spread the
maintenance costs but retain at least 55% ownership in the boat,
as stated in the contract. (Tl at 239)

As shown on his copy of

the contract, Mr. Madsen did agree that he had changed five weeks
to six weeks and had initialled that change. (Tl at 240, D. Exh.
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2)

Clearly this is not a major shift in usage, and could be

easily absorbed from the Madsens' retaining interest. However,
to have agreed to six or seven summer weeks for one 10% owner, as
claimed by Plaintiff, would have resulted in the loss of 30-35%
of the prime summer weeks.

Clearly Madsens could not sustain

such an allocation with a total of 4 partners if each had 10%
particularly if each received the same deal.
If it was the intent of the contract to provide six weeks,
then two would be prime "summer" weeks which was defined by the
court as May 1 through September 30. R 277, P 14, L 22), then
the remaining 4 would be non-peak weeks for which the non-peak
rental rate would be the comparable measure of value to that
accepted by the trial court.
Therefore, even if the court found that Plaintiffs were
entitled to 6 summer weeks, given the fact that there was no
evidence that non-peak weeks were withheld, the appropriate
measure of Plaintiffs' damages would be the value of the premium
weeks less the value of the non-premium weeks which were actually
made available.

Unfortunately, the court refused to allow

testimony as to the value of non-peak weeks, although Defendants'
Exhibit 3 which was admitted does show a non-peak value of $1199
per week.

Therefore, if the non-peak weeks were worth $1199 and

the court found that the summer weeks were worth $18 00, then
Plaintiffs would be entitled to the difference between the two or
$601 per week for each week which they prove that they were
denied usage.
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By totally disregarding the value of the non-peak weeks, the
court grossly inflated the damages awarded to Plaintiffs, thereby
resulting in an award that was nearly 8 times the original
purchase price for the contract. (R 414-415)
Finally, in making its calculation of damages, the court
found that Plaintiffs had utilized the boat during 6 weeks, when
by the testimony of Paul Gardner he admitted having used the boat
for 9 weeks. (R 277, P 14, cf Tl at 63, 18-19)
In actuality, since the contract with NUF 1 was void,
Madsens are entitled to damages under either subsection b or
subsection c of the Restatement of Contracts 2d, cited above.

In

order to return Madsens to a position as good as they would have
been in had they not relied upon the contract, Madsens should be
reimbursed in the amount of $18 00 per week for a minimum of the 9
weeks which Plaintiff Gardner testified that he used the boat,
plus reimbursement for the damages actually caused to the boat by
Plaintiffs during periods of their exclusive use and control.
Under subsection c of the Restatement position, Defendants
would be entitled to the value of any benefit that they conferred
upon Plaintiffs. As noted in Am Jur 2d
"Restitution is a common form of relief in
contract cases. Its objective is not the
enforcement of the contract through
protection of a party's expectation or
reliance interests, but the prevention of
unjust enrichment. The restitution interest
is the interest of the non-defaulting party
in the benefit which he conferred on the
person in default of the contract and prior
to its breach." 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages,
Section 54.
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In this particular case, the position in subsections b and c
essentially go "hand in glove" with each other.

That usage which

was conferred upon Plaintiffs was the same usage which was denied
to Defendants.
The more difficult question is whether or not defendants are
entitled to restitution for the costs of the damages caused to
the boat during the time that it was under the exclusive control
of Plaintiff Paul Gardner.

As mentioned above, the trial court

found that Defendants had failed to prove negligence on the part
of Plaintiffs with respect to the major damage to the outdrives
and engines.

In doing so, the court ignored the doctrine of res

ipsa

with respect to those issues, while obviously

loquitur

applying that doctrine to the damage that was caused to the
refrigerator while the boat was under Gardner's control. (R 277
at P 12, 15-16)
Defendants admittedly could not prove that they observed
Plaintiffs negligent operation of the boat which caused the
damage to the propellers and outdrives, but they did provide
testimony that when the boat was used last prior to Mr. Gardner
taking the boat it was in good working order and that when it was
next observed after Gardner's usage, the damage was discovered.
(Tl at 209-217)
Unfortunately, any case involving damages or negligence
outside the presence of a third party is a difficult fact issue.
The trier of fact has broad discretion in making its findings.
Therefore, the impartiality of the judge is even more essential
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to the integrity of the legal process in situations like this.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE
The evidence is undisputed that Clayton H. Wilkinson is the
nephew of the trial judge, Homer F. Wilkinson.

As the son of

Judge Wilkinson's brother, Clayton Wilkinson clearly fits in to
the definition of a "third-degree relationship" as set forth in
the Code of Judicial Conduct. (See Appendix B)

It is undisputed

that Defendants had no knowledge of the family relationship
between the Judge and his nephew until well after the completion
of the trial. (R 345-346)

The evidence is undisputed that on

receiving information regarding a possible conflict Defendants
took timely action to verify the allegation and then promptly
filed their Motion for New Trial and Reassignment of Judge. (R
343-346) Finally, it is clear that Judge Wilkinson never gave any
indication to the parties that Clayton Wilkinson was, in fact,
his nephew or that there was any possibility of a conflict of
interest due to that relationship.
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a very stringent view
toward the disqualification of judges when there is an apparent
conflict of interest.

The stringency of this posture was clearly

set forth in the case of Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert,
83 0 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992) where the Supreme Court reversed a
unanimous Court of Appeals decision under circumstances where one
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of the three judges was related by marriage to two partners in a
law firm representing one of the parties before the court. The
relationship in that case was brother-in-law and father-in-law,
and there was no indication that Judge Billings would share in
any pecuniary interest as a result of her relationship; the
relatives had no visible participation in the case. id. at 254.
In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. Appellant challenged Judge
Billings participation on three grounds:
"First, Section 78-7-1 of the Code requires
judicial disqualification when the judge has
a relationship of consanguinity or affinity
within the third degree of a "party" to the
action, Utah Code Ann. Sec 78-7-1(1) (b)
(1991); second, canon 3(C)(1)(d) of the Utah
Code of Judicial Conduct ("U.C.J.C")
requires disqualification when a judge
presides over a case in which relatives
within the third degree of relationship have
an "interest" that would be "affected by the
outcome," U.C.J.C. canon 3(C)(1)(d)(1990);
and third, canon 2 of the U.C.J.C. requires
disqualification in circumstances that create
an appearance of judicial impropriety,
U.C.J.C. canon 2 (1990). Id. at 255, 256.
The Supreme Court did not reach the first and third
objections, since the matter was reversed on the second ground.
Id. at 256.
The facts of that case were similar to those in the instant
action since the party raising the disqualification issue was not
aware of the conflict of interest at the time that the matter was
heard and decided in the Court. Id. at 254. As in this case,
appellant made no contention that the judge's failure to
disqualify herself was either "intentional or malicious" or that
the judge would have acted differently if the firm to which her
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relatives by marriage had not been involved. Id. at 256.
Appellant there did argue, however that the judge's participation
in the case created..."an appearance of impropriety" _Id. at 256.
As this case, the Regional Sales Agency, Inc.f relationship
between the judge in question and the interested party
was..."within the third-degree of relationship to Judge...or her
husband." Id. at 256.
In determining "an interest that could be substantially
affected," the Regional Sales Agency court analyzed several
factors and ultimately reached a "brightline proscription". Id.
at 257. Judge Zimmerman stated that proscription as follows:
We therefore conclude that under Canon 3, a
relative of the requisite degree of
relationship has an "interest" that might be
sufficiently "affected by the outcome" of a
case in every situation where a judge sits on
a case in which the judge's relative is a
partner or otherwise an equity participant in
a firm that represents a party to the case,
id at 257 (emphasis in original)
In this case, Clayton Wilkinson is not an attorney partner
in a law firm but he is clearly a "partner or otherwise an equity
participant" in the Plaintiff corporation and partner with
Plaintiff Gardner.

Judge Wilkinson knew this on at least 3

different occasions.

In one instance Mr. Gardner testified that

the nephew was his "business partner in the real estate company".
(Tl at 124, 2-4)

In spite of those revelations, Judge Wilkinson

gave no indication that he had a nephew with the name Clayton
Wilkinson, nor did he take any other action which might
reasonably place Defendants on notice of the conflict of
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interest.
In Regional Sales Agency, Justice Howe in his dissent
expresses a concern that appellant had not made a timely and
appropriate objection at the time that the matter was before the
Court of Appeals. Ld. at 25 9-

The majority however felt that the

issue of judicial integrity was so significant that the issue
must be dealt with in any event.

That logic is even more

compelling here since the trial judge did know of the
relationship, but failed to disclose the fact.
Finally, in Regional Sales Agency the appellate court judge
disqualified was one of 3 judges who had voted unanimously on the
case, under circumstances where the issues over which those
judges had power were significantly narrowed by the Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the fact that the court was more
concerned with legal issues than fine-line factual
determinations.

As was set forth above, as the trier of fact in

this case, Judge Wilkinson was empowered to make factual
determinations within a wide range of discretionary power.

The

issues which he decided were hotly contested, and hinged on his
determination as to the credibility of witnesses giving
diametrically opposed testimony.

In making his factual

determinations, he also apparently disregarded the unopposed
testimony of the forensic document expert.
Under these circumstances the integrity of the judicial
system is far more susceptible to challenge as a result of the
appearance of a very significant conflict of interest on the part
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of the trier of fact than was the case in Regional Sales.
Just as the Supreme Court remanded Regional Sales Agency to
the Court of Appeals for a new hearing before a different panel,
if this Court finds that there is a contract and a party with an
enforceable interest to that contract, then this matter should be
remanded to the District Court for a new trial before a judge who
has not previously participated in the case.
POINT VI
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION AT TRIAL AND
ON THIS APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Code of Appellate Procedure,
parties to an appeal are entitled to their costs on appeal.
Similarly, where the trial court has awarded attorney's fees
below, the appellate court may award attorney's fees on appeal
where authorized by statute or rule of court. Christensen v.
Abbott, 671 P.2d 121,123 (Utah 1983).
It is also clear that where a contract provides for
attorney's fees, they should be awarded on appeal.

The rule

defined by Justice Wilkins is:
"We therefore adopt the rule of law that a
provision of payment for attorney's fees in a
contract includes attorney's fees incurred by
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at
trial, if the action is brought to enforce
the contract..." Management Services Corp. v.
Development A s s o c , 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah
1980)
In the present case, Appellant is faced with having incurred
very substantial attorney's fees in defending 2 actions brought
by Plaintiffs on a void contract, where the party to that
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contract has been dissolved.

The question then becomes whether

Appellants should be entitled to their costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to the underlying contract provision when the contract
itself is void.

Case law on this point is non-existent, but the

court can unquestionably award these costs and fees pursuant to
statute.
Section 78-26-56 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended) provides for an award of attorney's fees when there is
no contractual provision.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense of the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith
under Subsection (2).
In Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) citing the
case of Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983) the
Supreme Court defined....
"without merit" means "frivolous" or "having
no basis in law or fact" for purpose of § 7827-56, we found the terms "lack of good
faith" and "bad faith" to be synonymous. To
establish bad faith, one or more of the
following must be lacking:
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable
advantage of others;
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact
that the activities in question will,[sic]
hinder, delay or defraud others."id. at 1199
In the case before the court, Defendants have clearly
demonstrated the requisite bad faith to warrant an award of
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attorney's fees under this provision.

In the first case they

brought an action on behalf of a dissolved corporation with no
standing in the courts, on a contract that was void.

While there

may be an argument that this was or could have been done in the
furtherance of any arguable claim, such is clearly not the case
with the second action brought by the same attorney and the same
principals.

At the time that Plaintiffs filed this action there

had already been a determination by Judge Frederick in the first
case that there was no cause of action.

To bring a second

action, utilizing a complaint that was essentially the same
document as the first complaint, (with the exception of adding
the real party in interest as Plaintiff, and a related party in
interest as a Defendant) does not meet the test for good faith.
Clearly any rights which Mr. Gardner had, if any, existed prior
to the filing of the first complaint.

Similarly, the latter

named Limited Liability Company which was named in the

second

case as a Defendant existed at the time that the first complaint
was filed, and any allegations subsequently made by Plaintiffs
against that entity transpired prior to the entry of the
unappealed judgment against them on the first complaint.
Mr. Gardner, as the moving party in both cases was clearly
"privy" to the Plaintiff in the first case and all issues raised
in the second case could have been litigated prior to entry of
the first judgment. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough v.
Jerilvn Shelton Dawson, 2 98 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (1996) and Jacobsen
v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985).
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Plaintiffs' conduct in

this case is as much bad faith as the proscribed conduct in
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Ut. App. 1993)
where this Court awarded attorney's fees and double costs. JEd at
62.

CONCLUSION
The trial in this matter should never have continued after
the mention of Clayton H. Wilkinson and his relationship to
Plaintiffs in the case. Had the fact of that relationship been
revealed by the trial judge Defendants would have understandably
asked for a disqualification and a new trial. Unfortunately, the
court gave no indication of the conflict nor any disclosure of
the relationship.

This conflict of interest clouds the entire

proceeding and casts serious doubt upon the integrity of the
judicial system, particularly in light of the gross
inconsistencies between the rulings made by Judge Wilkinson in
this case and those on the same issues when they were previously
presented to Judge Frederick on the earlier case.
To reach the ruling which he did, the court had to disregard
the claims of res

judicata

and corporate dissolution that were

thoroughly briefed in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion
for Summary Judgment.

He further had to disregard the clear and

unambiguous content of the written content and the uncontradicted
testimony of the forensic document expert.

The court also

ignored the fact that Plaintiffs failed to prove "denial11 of
usage and the obvious contradictions and mis-statements and
testimony of Paul Gardner and his wife Beverly Gardner.
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The court awarded monetary damages to Plaintiffs that were
clearly inconsistent with what they had proved to have been
"denied usage".

The court's measure of damages also ignored the

residual value of the weeks that were unquestionably made
available to Plaintiffs, by awarding them the entire value of
each summer week.

In fact, those damages were based upon 6 weeks

actual usage rather than the 9 weeks as testified to by Plaintiff
Paul Gardner.
Finally, the court erred in failing to award costs and
attorney's fees to Defendants either under the terms of the
contract itself or pursuant to § 78-27-56 (UCA, 1953) and further
by making an award of costs and attorney's fees in favor of
Plaintiffs.
Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court
reverse the trial court's finding as a matter of law with respect
to the issues of res judicata

and corporate dissolution, and

remand the matter to the district court for trial before a new
judge on the issue of damages which should be awarded to
Defendants/Appellants, and on the issue of costs and attorney's
fees.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J2-&

day of February, 1997.

NEIL B. CRIST
Attorney for Defendants
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16-10-88.2

CORPORATIONS

16-10-38.2. Suspension — Notice — Failure to remove suspension.
< 1) A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days
after the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall
be suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under Section
59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the corporation,
unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already suspended for
any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its corporate existence
and may carry on any business so long as it also takes the necessary steps to
remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing.
(2) A notice of suspension shall state:
(a) that the certificate of incorporation of the corporation has been
suspended;
(b) the reason for the suspension;
(c) the date of the suspension;
(d) that the corporation may remove the suspension by correcting the
delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee determined by the division
pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3 (2), or, if its certificate of incorporation
has been suspended under Section 59-7-155, by complying with the provisions of Section 59-7-157; and
(ei that the corporation will be dissolved 120 days after the date of
mailing the notice of suspension unless the corporation has removed the
suspension before that time.
(3) The division shall include an annual report form with any notice of
suspension under this section for failure to file an annual report.
(4) If the corporation does not remove the suspension within 120 days after
the date of mailing the notice of suspension, the corporation shall be dissolved;
the division shall mail a certificate of dissolution to the corporation. No corporation so dissolved may be revived under this chapter or Section 59-7-157,
except as set forth in Subsection (OK The dissolution of any corporation precludes that corporation from doing business in its corporate character under
any name or assumed names filed on behalf of the dissolved corporation under
Section 42-2-5. On the date of dissolution, the corporation's right in any assumed names it may use is suspended. The name of the dissolved corporation
and any assumed names filed on its behalf are not available for one year from
the date of dissolution for use by any other domestic corporation, foreign
corporation transacting business in this state, or person doing business under
an assumed name under Section 42-2-5.
(5) Any corporation which has been dissolved under this section may,
within one year from the date of dissolution, be reinstated upon application
and payment of all past due taxes, penalties, and reinstatement fees.
(6) All notices and certificates under this section shall be mailed first-class,
postage prepaid, and shall be addressed separately to the registered agent and
at least one officer of the corporation who is not the registered agent or to two
officers if there is no registered agent of record, at their most current mailing
addresses appearing on the records of the division.
History: C. 1953, 66-10-38.2, enacted by L.
1987. ch. 66, § 13; 1983, ch. 222, § 9; 1990,
ch. 108. § 16.

Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987,
ch. 66. } 13 repeals former § 66-10-38.2, as enacted by Laws 1985. ch. 178. § 57. relating to

16-10-100, Survival of remedy after dissolution.
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim
existing, or any liability incurred, pnjxc £p iv*ru dissolution if action or other
proceeding thereon is commenced (within two years\after the date of such
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding b> ur agcLlnst the corporation may
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such
period of two years so as to extend its peViod of duration.
History: L. 1961, ch. 23, § 100; 1984, ch.
'

661 § 115

Meaning of "this act." - See the note under the same catchline following § 16-10-56.

APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 12
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
ADOPTED JANUARY 1, 1994
Compiler's Notes. — The Code of Judicial
Conduct is repealed and reenacted effective
January 1, 1994.
TERMINOLOGY.
CANON

1. A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

CANON

3. A judge shall perform the duties of the
office impartially and diligently.
4. A judge shall so conduct the judge's extrajudicial activities as to minimize the
risk of conflict with judicial obligations.
5. A judge shall refrain from political activity
inappropriate to the judicial office.
APPLICABILITY.

TERMINOLOGY
"Candidate" means a non-judge seeking selection for judicial office, or a
judge seeking selection for or retention in judicial or non-judicial office. A
person becomes a candidate as soon as the person makes a public announcement of candidacy, declares or files as a candidate with the election or appointment authority, or authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions
or support, whichever occurs first.
"De minimis" denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reasonable question as to a judge's impartiality.
"Economic interest" denotes ownership of a more than de minimis legal or
equitable interest, or a relationship as officer, director, advisor, or other active
participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(i) ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund
that holds securities is not an economic interest in such securities unless
the judge participates in the management of the fund or a proceeding
pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the
value of the interest;
(ii) service by a judge as an officer, director, advisor or other active
participant in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization, or service by a judge's spouse, parent or child as an officer,
director, advisor or other active participant in any organization, does not
create an economic interest in securities held by that organization;
(iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary interest of a
policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual
savings association or of a member in a credit union, or a similar proprietary interest, is not an economic interest in the organization unless a
proceeding pending or impending before the judge could substantially
affect the value of the interest;
(iv) ownership of government securities is not an economic interest in
the issuer unless a proceeding pending or impending before the judge
could substantially affect the value of the securities.
"Family" denotes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other
relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship.
"Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee,
and guardian.
"Judge Pro Tempore." A judge pro tempore is a lawyer who is serving as a
specially appointed judge pro tempore pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-1.5
or Article VIII, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
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Canon 1

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

HQQ

"May" denotes discretionary conduct or conduct that is not covered by specific proscriptions.
"Political organization" denotes a political party or other group, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to
political office.
"Shall" and "shall not" impose binding obligations to respectively engage in
or refrain from the described conduct. The failure to act in accordance with
those obligations can result in disciplinary action.
"Should" and "should not" are used to indicate conduct that is respectively
encouraged or discouraged. The failure to engage in or refrain from such
conduct cannot result in disciplinary action.
"Third degree of relationship" denotes the following relatives: great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild,
great-grandchild, nephew or niece.

CANON 1
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this
Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective.

CANON 2
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID LMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
the judge's judicial conduct or judgment/A judge shall not lend the prestige of
the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
.position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a
character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of
business or social life.
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religious
organization, which practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, religion, or national origin.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Consorting with, or maintaining
social relations with, criminal figure as ground

for disciplinary
A.L.R.oth 923.

action against judge, 15

CANON 3
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY.
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judg«
take precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial dutiei
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the perfor*
mance of these duties, the following standards apply.
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge excepi
those in which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or traa*'
fer to another court occurs.

Canon 3
<2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence.
A judge shall no-: be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism.
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before
the judge.
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of
staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control.
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by wordi or conduct
manifest bia3 or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use
all reasonable efforts to deter, stall, court officials and others subject to
judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to
avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial.
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.
This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, 3exual orientation or socioeconomic
status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding.
(7) A judge shall accord to ever/ person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or that person^ lawyer, full right to be heard according to
law. Except as authorized by law, a judge 3hail neither initiate nor consider, and 3hall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning
a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's
adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge
does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending
before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending
proceeding shall occur between the trial judge and an appellate court
unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any oral
communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of
a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the
court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in
writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their
lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently,
and fairly.
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect its outcome or impair it3 fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A
judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel
subject to judicial direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a
judge from making public 3tatement3 in the course of official duties or
from explaining for public information the procedures of che court. This
Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a
personal capacity.
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize juror3 for their verdict
other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express
appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the
community.
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(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to
the public.
(12) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording in
the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of
court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of
judicial administration; or
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings.
(13) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion picture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent
thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that
still photographs of the judge and other court personnel, counsel, spectators, parties and witnesses are permissible, subject to restrictions specified by the court and subject, in the case of parties and witnesses, to their
advance consent in writing, provided that the court shall specifically forbid the taking of any photographs where it finds a substantial likelihood
that such activity would jeopardize a fair hearing or trial in the matter at
issue.
C. Administrative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence
in judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court
officials in the administration of court business.
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to
judicial direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and
diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or
prejudice in the performance of their official duties.
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of
other judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other
judicial responsibilities.
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise
the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall
avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to
information generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Program.
E. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or
a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy,
had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the
time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a
material witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary,
or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has

an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judged knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed
about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor
children residing in the judge's household.
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of
Canon 3E may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the
parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether
to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record,
or if written, filed in the case file.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Interest substantially affected.
Under Subdivision (EXIXdXiii) of this canon,
a relative of the requisite degree of relationship has an "interest" that might be sufficiently "affected by the outcome*' of a case

whenever a judge 3it3 on a case in which the
judge'3 relative is a partner or otherwise an
equity participant in a firm that represents a
party to the case. Regional Sales Agency, Inc.
v. Reichert, 830 ?.2d 252 (Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note,
Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity
of the Judiciary: State Bar of Nevada v.
Claiborne, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 283.
A.L.R. — Disqualification from criminal
proceedings of trial judge who earlier presided
over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72
A.L.R.4th 651.
Abuse or misuse of contempt power as
ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76
A.L.R.4th 982.
Disciplinary action against judge for engag-

ing in ex parte communication with attorney,
party, or witness, 82 A.L.R.4th 567.
Judge's previous legal association with attorney connected to current case as warranting
disqualification, 85 A.L.R.4th 700.
Removal or discipline of state judge for neglect of, or failure to perform, judicial duties,
87 A.L.R.4th 727.
Disciplinary action against judge on ground
of abusive or intemperate language or conduct
toward attorneys, court personnel, or parties to
or witnesses in actions, and the like, 89
A.L.R.4th 273.
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1

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1995; A.M. SESSION

2

J U D G E ' S

B E N C H

R U L I N G

3
4

THE COURT:

Counsel, I am going to give you my

5

decision.

6

accounting to the two of you to work out.

7

pencil to all these.

8

don't think there will be any problem.

9

Some of the things —

I have to leave some
I haven't put a

But with the way the Court is ruling, I

First of all, let me indicate to you that I think

10

the toughest question in this case is the question of the

11

standing of the corporation, the right to sue.

12

know what may take place.

13

am looking at it, I don't think that either party has given

14

the Court sufficient law for the Court to make —

15

the Court to be certain as to the position or what the law is

16

as far as the situation of this type is concerned.

17

And I don't

I'll say right now that the way I

well, for

I think each of you have stated your

18

understanding, and quoted statutes which I don't deny as far

19

as a corporation is concerned, a right to sue and a right to

20

be sued.

21

that a corporation not in good standing doesn't have the

22

right to sue.

23

that corporation gives that corporation a right to sue.

24

may be v/rong in that, but that's the position that I look at

25

it.

I think that the defendant is right when they argue

I'm not persuaded that going out and renewing
I

9

1

The Court was asked here today and was listening

2

to see what the evidence was going to be as far as any type

3

of assignment or a winding up and dissolution of the

4

corporation where the stockholders were given the right to

5

collect the debts of the corporation.

6

testimony on the assignment.

7

didn't come in.

8

it and it didn't come in.

9

I heard very sparse

I was waiting for more.

It

I was waiting for some strong objection to

So this Court, the only evidence this Court can

10

assume is there was some type of assignment given to

11

Mr. Gardner, of which he testified, to bring the action.

12

That if the assignment was there, I think he has the right to

13

bring the action in his name.

14

the name of the corporation, too, a d/b/a.

15

a d/b/a was proper in this situation.

16

And of course it's filed in
I don't know that

I also am persuaded somewhat that the whole

17

situation was dealt with by Mr. Gardner —

18

dealt with Mr. Gardner as him being Mr. Gardner, although he

19

did know that the NUF Corporation did sign in that way.

20

course he says the only reason it was was to keep the

21

knowledge away from his wife.

22

for it, that's not a sufficient reason to hide behind the

23

corporate veil.

24

Mr. Gardner, would have been responsible in the situation.

25

the defendant

Of

Well, if that was the reason

And in all probability the individual,

So this Court is going to deny the defendant's

1

motion to dismiss or summary judgment as far as the corporate

2

situation is concerned.

3

I already have, that it's vague in the Court's mind and there

4

is no absolute law given to the Court to base its decision

5

on.

6

Although I readily state to you, as

Now, the next situation is, these parties entered

7

into a contract on June 15th, 1990, and the Court is going to

8

enforce the terms of that contract.

9

that so many different, it seemed like, contracts are

I have never seen a case

10

floating around.

11

defendant Marilyn Madsen took the witness stand and said she

12

drafted the contract and she drafted five copies of it.

13

guess that's the reason that they are floating around.

14

if she made five copies, that was not good because everybody

15

got a different copy possibly of what the final contract was.

16

But I guess she's the defendant, the

So I
And

The one contract, Exhibit 2, does not have the

17

word "summer" written into it.

Exhibit 46 does have the word

18

"summer" written into it.

19

addition which was made later as far as the wave runners

20

being made a part of the contract.

21

included in it.

22

all probability was the contract of which the parties were

23

using, because they certainly pulled it out and wrote at a

24

later date the new material on it.

25

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Exhibit 2 does not have the

Exhibit 4 6 does have that

That leads me to believe that Exhibit 2 in

Your Honor, I'm sorry.

I believe

1

there is a misspeaking there.

2

the wave runner, 4 6 did not.

3
4

THE COURT:

You said Exhibit 2 did have

I'm sorry.

46 has the wave runner,

Exhibit 2 does not.

5

MR. CRIST:

You said it right, your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Well, anyway, that's the way it is.

7

has the wave runner on it and 2 does not.

8
9

46

The thing that convinces the Court to rule this
way is that when Mr. Throckmorton took the stand, he said

10

there were two and possibly three pens used.

11

that the "6" was crossed over and the "5" was probably

12

crossed over with two different pens and "summer" was written

13

in with a different pen.

14

And he said

Well, that leads me to believe that the parties

15

were doing some negotiating.

And that on one of them it was

16

written over at that time, the "6" was written over.

17

could you see?

18

again.

19

parties were adding or making changes to that part.

And

Even I could tell it had been written over

And with that being written over, I think that the

20

It appears that the "summer" then was written in

21

with the same pen and the "PG" was written on with the same

22

pen at the time that was done.

23

contract and didn't complete it on the other contract.

24

don't know that, but that's the way the Court is ruling.

25

am ruling that "summer" was part of the contract.

And they got it done in one
I
I

5

1

I am also ruling that the plaintiff had the

2

responsibility under the contract under subsection or

3

paragraph 3 to pay $100 a month to cover the 20 percent cost

4

of maintaining the insurance and the buoy fees.

5

ruling that the plaintiff agreed to reimburse sellers for 2 0

6

percent of out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred in

7

keeping the property and equipment in good working order or

8

to repair any damages.

9

ruling in paragraph 9 that the purchaser agreed to pay $100 a

That's in paragraph 4.

I am also

I am also

10

week towards reserve —

11

maintenance, and agrees to pay 20 percent of all maintenance

12

costs which may exceed any amount that is built up in the

13

reserve.

14
15

Or in other words, I am saying that this is a
valid contract and I am enforcing it.

16
17

or $100 a year towards reserve for

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Your Honor, may I ask you a

question about the reserve?

18

THE COURT: Yes.

19

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Is the reserve the $1200, any of

20

the $1200 —

21

insurance, or is it something else?

22
23

the $100 a month that isn't spent for buoy and

THE COURT:

No.

The reserve, it says, is $100 a

year.

24

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

25

THE COURT:

$100 a year.

$100 a year towards the reserve for

1

maintenance, and agrees to pay 20 percent of all maintenance

2

costs which may exceed that reserve.

3

the reserve in any particular year.

4

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

5

THE COURT:

And I would say, exceed

Yeah.

I am also of the opinion, and I so

6

rule, that the Rules and Regulations were attached to the

7

contract.

8

contract, it makes no difference to this Court because it

9

does say specifically in here a number of times that he is

But even if they were not attached to the

10

bound by the Rules and Regulations.

11

what they were, he should have found out what they were.

12

it was his responsibility, speaking of the buyer, and that he

13

is bound by the terms of the Rules and the Regulations

14

regardless of when he got them.

15

And if he didn't know
And

I am also of the opinion and so rule that the

16

Rules and Regulations were violated by the purchaser, the

17

buyer.

18

clear that the Court can find that what was violated was

19

No. 10, and that's where no pets were allowed on it. And

20

that that is not sufficient to forfeit the contract.

21

that even if others were violated, such as 8, it says,

22

"possible termination of Agreement for noncompliance."

23

And No. 13, it of course is the worst one —

24

I say the "worst" one, that could happen to the boat —

25

that's of course an act of negligence where they allow the

But the only one that is really —

the evidence is

And

when
and

7

1

destruction of the boat, and not putting the buoy up

2

properly, and the boat sinking, or burning up the engine and

3

running it without oil.

4

Neither of those took place.

There have been no

5

allegations of negligence whatsoever in this case.

6

have been some fault, there may have been some damage.

7

there has been no allegation of negligence.

8

no proving.

9

have in a sense alleged negligence but they certainly haven't

There may
But

There has been

When I say "no allegation," maybe the parties

10

proven or shown negligence on any particular party as far as

11

the damage to the boat.

12

subject to forfeiture.

13

Therefore, the contract is not

And as I say, even though it were, as counsel well

14

knows in all types of contracts, just the fact that it says

15

"forfeiture," it may be too harsh and the Court does not

16

always enforce that type of remedy anyway.

17

have to face that here.

18

Of course I don't

I am also of the opinion that there is some

19

negotiation between the buyer and the seller.

This got

20

involved —

21

about the seventh week —

22

complete.

23

notation on the contract that because of the fact that the

24

ski boat —

25

provided, the additional week was given.

and this is not clear here, and I am speaking
maybe my notes may be more

But that on the contract, the seller did make a

and I can't read this clear —

was not being
I am of the opinion

1

that that was for that one year and it was not a permanent

2

situation because that's when they were negotiating as far as

3

the particular situation is concerned.

4

Now, this Court also has to look somewhat at the

5

credibility of the witnesses here. And I think basically

6

everybody who has testified in this case has been honest.

7

think the memories have faulted.

8

live with something so long, and even though it wasn't true

9

originally, you convince yourself that it's the truth.

10

I

That sometimes when you

And I don't know why this case was not brought

11

before this Court a year and a half ago to be disposed of.

12

Because that's what should have been done instead of allowing

13

it to run on like this and the damages to continue to incur.

14

There is no need for it.

15

As I say, even the evidence becomes more forgetful as far as

16

the parties are concerned.

17

Anyway, that's where we are now.

Now, I was concerned when the defendant took the

18

witness stand.

And of course he said that the purchase price

19

was reduced from $10,000 [sic] —

20

and that's why paragraph 2 was struck out, and that the ski

21

boat and the wet bike were not included.

22

sense, because you have Option 1 and Option 2.

23

the witness stand and testified later also that of course

24

they were included in it, and changed his testimony on that

25

when he was confronted on cross examination.

from $12,500 to $10,000,

And that made
Then he took

9

1

I was concerned when the defendant on the witness

2

stand also testified that the wave runners had not been paid

3

for.

4

talk to his witness and refresh his memory, and that's fine.

5

But he was quite adamant that they had not been paid for

6

prior to the counsel talking to him on the situation.

7

that led me to believe somewhat that the testimony of the

8

defendant was maybe a little more forgetful or a little more

9

needing to make himself whole in this situation.

And counsel talked to him.

10

And sure, I let counsel

So

The Court would find that the defendant was

21

selling

12

want to sell it. And he was going to have to sell others in

13

order to survive on it or to be able to maintain a reasonable

14

living.

15

that's why he was looking for additional funds to come in.

16

And there is nothing wrong with that.

17

looking for any person responsible to pay the expenses.

18

this

because

it

And that's fine.

Defendant's Exhibit 7.

20

to do the accounting.

21

for the buoy fee.

22

years and six years.

23

years and a few months.

25

didn't

That's why he was doing it and

And he was also

Now, I am looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 and

19

24

was a hardship on him, and he

Here's where I am expecting counsel
I think the plaintiff is responsible

Nov;, there is testimony here of three
I guess it's really been about five

And I don't know where you are going as far as I
notice that the Nauti Lady as a limited partnership is a

1

party defendant.

2

well, it is binding on them.

3

binding on them.

4

So I guess that this is binding on them

—

I am not guessing it, it is

But when I say the "buoy fee," when I say for

5

three years, I am talking about a responsibility between the

6

plaintiff and the defendant Madsen in this case.

7

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Your Honor, can we run that from

8

June 15th, 1990 to what date?

9

there.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

12

THE COURT:

Just so we can put those in

It would be June 15th of '93.

Yes.

So that would be three years.
That's what I am saying.

I am

13

not saying he is not responsible —

14

for up to date.

15

he still I guess is the major owner of it.

16

the plaintiff is not bound by anything of the limited

17

partnership or any bylaws of the limited partnership.

18

his dealings were with Mr. Madsen and only dealing with

19

Mr. Madsen, and that he would be responsible for the buoy fee

20

up to today's date.

21
22
23

well, he is responsible

But as far as this —

well, this gentleman,
I would find that

That

He would also be responsible for the general
maintenance at $100 a year up to today's date.
And he would be responsible for 20 percent of all

24

maintenance fees which exceeds the maintenance fee, when it

25

exceeded it.

In other words, when the lower unit, the drive

11

1

units, had to be repaired, that was, as I recall, '91, then

2

of course that's the time you are looking at the 20 percent

3

coming into play.

4

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

7

THE COURT:

That's above the $100 a year?

That's right.
Yeah.

And the Court is going to find that the

8

damages alleged in paragraph 5 and paragraph 6 are to be

9

shared between the plaintiff Gardner and the defendant Madsen

10

on an 80/20 percent basis.

11

that any one particular party damaged the boat either

12

negligently or otherwise, and that each party is to pay their

13

percentage share.

14

as the property replacement.

15

That the evidence is not clear

And that that would also include 7 as far

But the plaintiff is responsible for the

16

refrigerator damage.

That looking at the accounting, the

17

Court would give the plaintiff credit as an offset for the

18

items on the accounting on P-12 against this responsibility

19

as the buoy fee, the general maintenance and the 20 percent

20

maintenance.

21

the Devot or the slide winch.

22

adjust that out between the two of them as to what the

23

responsibilities to each were.

24

by the plaintiff, you would receive credit or an offset on

25

the maintenance.

But that does not —

well, it would include on

The parties are first to

And then for the overpayment

1
2

MR. SUMMERHAYS:
Honor.

I'm sorry.

3

MR. CRIST:

4

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

5

I didn't understand that, your

I don't either.
Was that 80/20 on the slide or

Devot or plaintiff was paying for it?

6

THE COURT:

No, no.

80/20 on the slide and Devot.

7

Any ajnount paid over 20 percent, he would receive an offset

8

on the others.

9

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

10
11

THE COURT:

For maintenance.

Of course the wave runner, naturally

that's not included here nor is the purchase price.

12

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

No.

When you say the wave runner

13

is not included, your Honor, are you finding that he didn't

14

sell the wave runner?

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

17

THE COURT:

18

21
22
23
24
25

He did sell the wave runner.

Yes. My understanding on the wave

runner, that that took care of itself, didn't it?

19
20

Oh, yes.

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Yeah.

That was a separate deal —

oh, no.
MR. CRIST:

There were separate damages for the

wave runners.
MR. SUMMERHAYS:

We paid $4500.

He never got any

wave runners.
MR. KENNETH MADSEN:

That's not true, your Honor.

13

1
2
3

MR. SUMMERHAYS:
your Honor.

You need to make a finding on that.

MR. CRIST:

4

use of them.

5

signed that stuff.

6
7

That was my client's testimony,

What is it you are saying?

He had the

He testified that he put them in storage and

THE COURT:

My recollection of the testimony, the

wave runners were purchased, he paid the $4500 on them.

8

I am just looking at the contract here.

9

And that he paid $4500 and that was 50 percent and

10

he owns 50 percent of the three wave runners. And that takes

11

care of itself.

12

off of here.

13

not receive any purchase price.

That's why he would not receive any credit

Just the same as the purchase price, he would

14

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

15

THE COURT:

16

On that $4500?

That's right.

The Court would also find that the contract is in

17

force and the plaintiff was entitled to six weeks each year

18

since its inception, except for the one year and that was

19

seven weeks, although I am eliminating that seventh week

20

because I think that the period that the boat v/as down, it

21

v/as into a period and part of what they say is the prime

22

summertime, May through October.

23

some responsibility on that.

24

six weeks, summer weeks, since the contract was entered into.

25

I am not persuaded that the testimony was clear at

And I think that he has

And so I am saying that it is

1

$3500.

In fact, I thought the testimony was very sparse as

2

far as what the value of the week was.

3

that the Court has is $1800 a week.

4

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

May I ask about the week

5

calculation, your Honor?

6

'91, '92, '93, '94 and '95?

7

THE COURT: Yes.

8

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

9

THE COURT:

The best testimony

Would that be six weeks for '90,

So that would be 36.

Well, no, let's see.

I am not going to

10

give six weeks in '90, not in '90, not summertime weeks in

11

'90 because they were entered into June 15th.

12

and a half.

13

month —

14

each year thereafter.

15
16

that's the middle of the

I am giving three weeks for '90 and six weeks for

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Is that less the —

THE COURT:
of use.

The testimony was that he had six weeks

Less the six weeks.

19

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

20

THE COURT: Any questions?

21

MR. SUMMERHAYS: No.

22
23
24
25

how many usage

weeks did you find that he used?

17
18

I am going to say —

That's a month

Okay.

Your Honor, the attorney's fees issues.
MR. CRIST:

I don't understand this.

Are you

saying that he was denied six weeks or he got the six v/eeks?
THE COURT:

He used the boat six weeks since he has

15

1

been in the contract.

2

damages that he is entitled to.

3

entitled to three weeks for '90, six weeks for '91, '92, '93,

4

'94 and '95, less six weeks that he had the use of the boat.

5
6

MR. CRIST:

I believe that's what the testimony

MR. CRIST:

It's not even close, your Honor.

It's

THE COURT:

If you can point me out where that is

MR. CRIST:

He testified himself that he used it 11

wrong.

13
14

THE COURT:

going to be appealed anyway.

11
12

You are finding he only had use of the

was.

9
10

I am saying that he is

boat six weeks total?

7
8

And that is taken away from any

weeks.

15

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

16

THE COURT:

He said six, your Honor.

If I'm wrong on that, counsel —

my

17

notes as I read them were six weeks, and that's my memory.

18

If I am wrong on that, then of course you'll have to look at

19

the record.

20
21

MR. SUMMERHAYS: We'll check the record, your
Honor.

And I think counsel and I can work that out.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SUMMERHAYS: Attorney's fees, your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

25

fees.

Any other questions?

The contract does provide for attorney

I have not seen the Affidavit which has been

1

submitted.

2

I am going to allow reasonable attorney fees.
I probably will be somewhat skeptical —

or

3

"critical," I should use the term —

4

because I am of the opinion there was no reason for this case

5

to go on the length of time that it has.

6

not allow any attorney fees naturally for Judge Frederick's

7

case.

8

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

9

THE COURT:

of the attorney fees

Of course I will

We didn't submit any.

So I will have to look at the

10

Affidavit, which I haven't had an opportunity to, and give

11

you a call, counsel.

12

to you and let you know on the attorney fees.

13

Or you may call me if I don't get back

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

Your Honor, when I say I didn't

14

submit any on Judge Frederick's, that's what I was told by my

15

people, and I hope that is what it is. But we agree we

16

shouldn't get any attorney fees on any part of that.

17
18

THE COURT:

Mr. Summerhays, I ask you to prepare

the pleadings.

19

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SUMMERHAYS:

22

(This concludes these proceedings at 1:07 p.m.)

23

I will do so, your Honor.

Court will be in recess.
Thank you, your Honor.

* * *

24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E
2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

4

)

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSR, do certify that I am

5

a nationally certified Registered Merit Reporter, a state

6

Certified Shorthand Reporter, and a Notary Public in and for

7

the State of Utah.

8
9

That at the time and place of the proceedings in
the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the

10

Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Homer

11

F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the

12

proceedings had therein.

13

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the

14

Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the

15

foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and

16

correct transcript of the same.

17
18

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 6th day of November 1995.

19
20
Suzann<3 Warnick, RMR, CSR
21
I ESi ESSI ESS C B S B B 9 £ » BO]

22

NOTARY PU8U8

23
24
25

.

My commission expires
1 April 1999
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EXHIBIT B

AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered i n t o t h i s

IS

day of Zv>/ ( 1989, by and between

KEN MADSEN and MARILYN MADSEN, husband and w i f e , of 4807 Yorktown D r i v e , S a l t
Lake

City,

A) vlP

<

Utah

84117,

XvoC <\ &)n\

Vo^ ki-fi

hereinafter

Sfrftf <

referred
,a

i -to*!

to

"SELLERS'1

as

•-•fe«gfer

of

and

JWJ~

# Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as "BUYERS";

In c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r mutual p r o m i s e s , t h e p a r t i e s agree as f o l l o w s :
OPTICN NO- 1:
1.

SELLERS a g r e e to s e l l

and BUYERS a g r e e t o purchase a t e n

percent

(10%) i n t e r e s t in t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y :
62 f o o t

Summerset

Cruiser

houseboat

including

the

accessories

t h e r e o n , a J e t Ski Boat and a Wet B i k e .
i R S a g r e e t o pay t o SELLERS t h e to£aL-^*rchabcf p i l L c u£ T/ZEcVE
THOUSAND DOLLAR^^F^VETHUNDRED " DOLLARS

($i2,oUo7~?^l—the-

^ l b e d property.
' '-"?«**<:

C

OPTICN NO, 2 :

Same as above excluding Ski Boat and Wet Bike, BUYERS agree to pay
.^a**"

to SELLERS for r.en percent (10%) interest in the 62 foot Sumnrer

• J -V.

>;-**

Cruiser houseboat TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).
BUYERS agree to pay an additional ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100.00) per
month to cover twenty

'B

r

{$%) percent of tne cosus to maintain

insurance and buov fees and other miscellaneous costs incurred to

I
maintain the property.

(insurance and storage fees for ski boat ar.d

wet bike have not yet been determined).

tor twenty-**- # » > *
OTT™s
„
=
to
reimburse
SELLERS
tor
=are
BWERS further agree
^ r e a s o n a W y incurred to keep
^ c e n t of any out-of-fccket expense
^ ^
^
^
^
property and . * * » « * thereon in

tne

repair

„

any

pRRW.

(Re£er

BOffiR S

will -

or e ^ n t

^

failures

to Boat Rules and M

-

^

«*
^

^

- t i t l e d to the exclusive |

^

^
^

d e s c r i e d property for a total % £ ^ y ^

above

^

^

Qf

tte

^

^

^

use

to Boat » U - > * - « " " ^
r i g h t of
• , SELLER would then have the riy
unscheduled time) • SELLER
^
^
^

^ i v e

(refet

^

of

use

and possession of the property
Time Schedule for 1990 will be neg
Time
.
^
c a l e n d a r year.
BUVEBS and SELLERS at the u «

of signl g

Year.

^

Future
^

^

,

.. . . ^ v are the owners

sal£BS

really « ~

the

o£

^

^

Schedules will t e s e , . , at the « u -

Tim2

of

above d e s e r t

and ^ e e ^
property an

^

h*

^ ^

^

^

^
^

^

property.
,

The

^ t s a i d property
^ i f i c a l l y acknowledge and agree tn
parties s p e c i a l l y
^
^
^
^
tte

above is being sold
- f l t l e SELLERS raske no further warr
warranties c- t i t l e ,
„ -aid described property,
c o n d i t i o n off said
^
^

de5Ctit

^

acknowledge that they have «
in
and

its

~

^

^

present condition and upon thei

without reliance upon representations of th

^

^

^

^

specifically
^

^
^

sams

^

- 3 8.

SELLERS agree to continue to maintain collision and liability
insurance on said property.

9.

In addition to the purchase price and the aforementioned expenses,
each BUYER agrees to pay $1001 per year towards a reserve for
maintenance and agrees to pay ^SSror all maintenance costs which may
exceed the reserve.

10.

BUYER agrees to be bound by the attached Rules & Regulations, the
attached usage schedule and specifically for forfeiture provisions
contained in the Rules & Regulations which provide the circumstances
under which a BUYER will forfeit his entire interest in the cruiser.

11.

The parties agree that should BUYER desire to sell his interest in
the Cruiser, the decision as to the sale can only be made upon
agreement between SELLER and JEUYER.

Should SELLER and BUYER

determine to sell the cruiser, it will be sold and the proceeds
therefrom, after paying all sales expenses and etc. shall be divided
according to the percent owned.
12.

The SELLER and BUYER agrees that any decision as to trading the
Cruiser in on a successor cruiser will only be made by unanimous
decision of SELLER and BUYER.

13.

The Cruiser (Nauti Lady) will remain harbored at Hite Marina, Lake
Powell, UT.

14.

It is the intent of the SELLER to retain controlling interest of 55%
of the Cruiser.

,

15.

The

does ^ " P * * undersigned dees hereby pure™

cruiser

and other described property.

« " r0 " t
^

^

,10%1

°f

S3id

^ ^

»

^
^

^
^

^

this * r — * • the a * - * * « « *
*
att orneys f ees and costs o, the p r e v a i l pa rt V

™,-his
A f day o£A^_lS9°DATED
this _££—
p-^

/

//I Y

j

"Seller"

•DTT^DSST

MARILYN K. MADSEN

"Buyer

3T A« yv/v
/NJ

\

XS

V-f Q^V<

^

(j ^"

fl_i-£_

6*~V

*

^

